The Consequences of Bluth’s Theory of Identity
Although I am far from mastering the Judith Butler piece, I mus say that my reaction to it was something like repulsion, discomfort. If I simplify my reading of the Bluth passage by interpreting her as merely saying that society arbitrarily attaches “feminine” or “masculine” distinctions to one’s behaviors. When a young boy plays dress-up, his action in itself does not in any mean he is a “sissy” and predilected to feminity, only in so far as our societal categories have made them such. This is a very simple, most likely very incorrect understanding of Bluth which I have no problems with.
What disturbs me, however, is when the passage becomes an issue of identity. There is something nihilistic in her apparent wish to destroy our so-called restrictive conceptions of identity (this interpretation I got both from the essay itself and, more clearly, from the introduction.) Do her theories account for anything like a true identity? Seemingly not, for even the soul is “the prison of the body.” In class we also spoke of the dissolution of identity as a kind of freedom, which further struck me as disturbingly nihilistic. And, finally, what happens when we apply her identity theories to ethnicity? Would it be somehow different if we tell an African-American, “All your concerns and your peculiar historical position is a superimposed fabrication.”? Or am I simply too rash and prejudicial to fully understand Bluth?
Holler wrote:
While I agree that Butler maintains a certain level of nihilism in her argument, I think your understanding of identity remains bounded by the limitations that Butler defines as restrictions. This may not be a bad thing; you can choose to identify yourself based on basic gender roles or through masculinity/femininity, whether that choice is conscious or not. I do not necessarily agree with Butler’s entire stance, but I think her commentary on the fluidity of identity is relevant.
Whether or not we view it as such, we define ourselves (or are defined) by our sex, gender and sexuality. Because she uses relatively extreme terms, Butler’s distinctions seem irrational, a bit out of left field, but behind the initial opposition, there lies some truth. If we were so inclined, we could identify ourselves as a different gender or have a sex change; our identities are defined beyond the physical being and its associated characteristics.
When we impose this logic on the idea of ethnicity, it becomes tricky. Perhaps this is a cop out, but I’m not convinced that you can apply Butler’s ideas to ethnicity. The definitions of one’s culture may be changing – cultures naturally evolve – but you cannot change your race or ethnicity. (I use race and ethnicity loosely here, although I recognize the distinctions between the two.) You may choose not to identify yourself with the African-American community, but you cannot say, “Hey. I’m actually Polish.” In this way, one’s views on ethnicity may change, but one’s ethnic identity cannot.
Posted 01 Oct 2007 at 3:07 pm ¶
sean wrote:
Jake and Holler,
The notion that we can if we choose to re-think gender so radically as to do away with it as a system of classification, and inhabit forms of difference as repetition is a bit much think about, once you start extrapolating into everyday practice. As to ethnicity, we will read a piece not too long from now that argues that ethnicity can be more about voluntary affiliation – self-definition- rather than being inscribed by someone else.
Posted 02 Oct 2007 at 6:29 pm ¶